In 1999, The Economist cited to the critics of gambling activities and raised the spectre that 'there might be a lot of money to be made by suing the' entities that knowingly get people addicted to gambling '.1 This observation paralleled the long-held conclusions among gambling addiction experts such as the former executive director . of the Council on Compulsive Gambling of New Jersey, Arnie Wexler, who highlighted the concerns of the gambling interests in 1997:
'I think the industry is sitting on its hands nervously looking· at what's happening to the cigarette industry', said Wexler, a frequent lecturer about compulsive [i.e., 'pathologicaI1 gambling. ' The stuff that happened to the cigarette industry is going to happen 10-20 years down the road, if not sooner?
As early as 1996, the Las Vegas gambling industry had a premonition of being saddled with mega-lawsuit problems similar to the tobacco industry, and had developed plans to counter the educational efforts of public interest groups,3 such as the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling (NCALG), an organization similar to Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). In 1996, in the heart of Las Vegas, the local paper opined a wake-up call to the gambling industry:
Gambling and tobacco. Tobacco and gambling. 18 l. W. KINDT have voted for the 'smoking gun' of gambling liability. This occurred when to protect the big gambling companies' market shares, they joined with the entire Commission and voted unanimously to condemn and recommend a prohibition on 'convenience gambling'. Convenience gambling consists primarily of gambling in convenient locations via electronic gambling devices (EGDs), also known as video gambling machines (VGMs)-which sociologists term the 'crack cocaine'7 of creating new addicted gamblers. 8 Specifically, recommendation 3-6 of the 1999 Gambling Commission stated that:
The Commission received testimony that convenience gambling, such as electronic devices in neighborhood outlets, provides fewer economic benefits and creates potentially greater social costs by making gambling more available and accessible. Therefore, the Commission recommends that states should not authoriu any further convenience gambling operations, and should cease and roll back existing operations. 9 In other words, if the pro-gambling commissioners recognized that EGDs/VGMs constituted dangerous products for public use when located in convenience stores, a fortiori those EGDs/VGMs constituted dangerous products when crammed into casinos located anywhere. lo These concerns capped the developing debate of the 19908 regarding the gambling industry and its promotion of gambling-oriented products and mechanismsparticularly as these products and mechanisms paralleled the potential harmful effects charged to other well-known industries.
Throughout the 20th century, the trend in the US was to hold corporations liable for the harm their products caused the general public. II A3-bestos, lead, and particularly tobacco, were the leading products that raised liability issues. 12 A3 potentially harmful gambling activities were legalized throughout the 19808 and 19908, a 1992 Harris Poll indicated that the proliferation of legalized gambling failed to raise concern among a majority of the American public. '3 However, by the mid-I990s, the public's awareness, coupled with US Congressional concerns had increased, and eventually culminated in the 1996 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act,14 which was enacted into law on 3 August 1996. This statute established the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, which charged nine commissioners with producing a report within 2 years. IS Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In this context, Tom Grey, the executive director of the NCALG, planned to utilize the public meetings of the 1996-1999 Gambling Commission to voice the concerns of public interest groups. Grey wondered if 'gaming industry executives might commit political suicide and follow the lead of tobacco executives who reportedly lied to members of Congress during hearings on the effects of cigarette smoking '. 16 This was not an unrealistic expectation, because the gambling industry appeared to be vulnerable to various types of mega-lawsuits, as well as Congressional scrutiny. For example, Law Professor Dan Polsby of Northwestern University, predicted 'an upswing in class-action lawsuits, if lawyers score(d} big with tobacco ' .17 Furthermore, Polsby indicated that there were 'a lot of industries that. .. [were] ri~ for tobacco-settlement kinds of detente', 18 including 'p]iquor, firearms, gambling '. 19 Retreating into the unexpected posture of gambling as an old 'vice' during the Gambling Commission's hearings, by 1998, the Las Vegas gambling interests evidenced more defensive concerns.
By focusing on regulation and taxation issues, however, the gambling industry was missing the real threat of mega-lawsuits initiated by the states. This analysis will compare the gambling industry to the tobacco industry. It predicts that in the future the gambling industry will be held fmancially liable by the states for the social and economic impact gambling has on US society. Furthermore, this analysis concludes that the gambling industry will be vulnerable to stateinitiated mega-lawsuits-even without specific costs being delimited either for individual 'pathological gamblers' or for individual 'problem gambiers'. Thus, defmitional debates and academic debates regarding socio-economic costs may be largely irrelevant with regard to the states' megalawsuits because the gambling industry's lobbyists at the American Gaming A3s0ciation (AGA) acting on behalf of the gambling industry, and individual gambling companies have acknowledged that the industry has created new pathological and problem gamblers during the 19908. Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) Owing to the addicted gamblers, bankruptcies, and crime caused by gambling activities, all gambling was criminalized throughout the US and much of the world during the latter half of the 19th century. Consequently, decision-makers had no pressing need to be educated about gambling economics and the associated social issues. With the widespread legalization of various US gambling activities in the 1980s and 1990s, and with the concomitant export of US gambling technology to the international community, the educational need emerged to infonn the public, government decision-makers, and even the educational community. Furthennore, as the world's economic leader, the US government needed to establish its strategic economic base (which includes primarily the entire US economy along with its import-export components) as being either primarily a nongambling economy or a 'gambling economy '. 21 Within the relevant regional market (tenned the 'feeder market' by gambling companies), legalized gambling activities do not create net new ec0-nomic development, or net new jobs because increased demand for gambling is mirrored by decreased demand for other sectors of the relevant market. The illusion of net new economic development and jobs occurs when gambling activities, such as new casinos,· are concentrated in a local market, but job losses within the 'relevant regional market', or 'feeder market' are outside the local market. When the entire strategic economy is growing, the transfer of consumer dollars into gambling dollars is largely hidden.
Economic MisperceptioDS According to Nobel
Prize-winning economist Paul Samuelson, 22 it is basic textbook economics that:
[Gambling] involves simply sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creating no new money or goods. Although it creates DO output, gambling does nevertheless absorb time and resources. When pursued beyond the limits of recreation, where the main purpose after all is to 'kill' time, gambling subtracts from the national income.23 Legalized gambling does provide recreation which is a service no different than a concert or a Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. play. However, from a political/economic viewpoint, Professor Jack VanDer Slik has summarized the basic principles emanating from reasoning equivalent to Samuelson's echoing in much of the academic community: '[State-sponsored gambling] produces no product, no new wealth, and so it makes no genuine contribution to economic development '. 24 Sometimes government officials have difficulty differentiating between the various forms of gambling that might become the subject of state lawsuits. Gambling industry economists have been criticized for taking advantage of uninitiated government officials by obfuscating the issues with analyses that switch between the various types of gambling. Generally, the various types of gambling are irrelevant to government decisionmaking when viewed in their proper strategic market. 2s In gambling industry studies, the underlying focus is usually on: (1) how fast money can be extracted from the public, and (2) how effiCiently money can be extracted from the public. 26 The techniques utilized to accomplish these goals usually consist of: (1) new, more and faster gambling technology, and (2) new and more sophisticated marketing. 27 The speed (and not the type) of the gambling is the proper focus.28 In a focused cost-benefit analysis, socio-economic costs, tax revenues, and other considerations should be calculated as a function of the degree of gambling (i.e., 'amounts lost' or 'gross revenues').29 In this context, lotteries are generally considered the slowest type of gambling because the wagering historically occurred once per time period (such as once per year, or more modernly, once per week).
Whereas, gambling via EGOs, particularly as they interface with the Internet, constitute the fastest forms of gambling. As the socio-economic negatives associated with gambling activities are a correlated function of the amounts lost, the speed with which the money is lost (and not the type of gambling) is the proper focus.
activities at the end of the 20th century, the accessibility and acceptability of gambling began to 'hook' new gamblers. One conclusion of a 1997 report by the Harvard Medical School was that the number of US citizens with 'severe gam-1( bling disorders' increased by 55%31 since the advent of Atlantic City gambling in 1977. In addition, 'the number of 'problem' gamblersthose who have lied, cheated, stolen, or suffered anxiety attacks as a result of gambling-[had] ... climbed from 4% of the adult population to 71 '10',32 However, the pathological and problem. gambling were not only confined to the adult population. Approximately 1.1 million adolescents from the age range from 12 to 18 were identifted as pathological gamblers. 33 In addition, in states such as Louisiana, it was reported that one in seven 18-21 year olds had a chronic gambling problem. 34 MisJeadIag Studies 8IId PR y"" ' ........ Another strategy common to both the tobacco and gambling industries appears to be their tendency to be connected to any research project conducted on their respective products, Those familiar with the topics typically agree that it is difficult to find objective research regarding the impact of legalized gambling on communities. 3s In fact, '[m] uch of the research that has been used in government decision making was prepared by researchers with close ties to the gambling industry '. 36 'There isn't one piece of research the industry has funded on the social costs of problem gambling that is ac:ademit;ally respectable. It's all self-serving', says scholar Hemry Lesieur of the Institute for Problem Gambling in Connecticut. ' the economic effect of gaming either in the broad economy or the derived revenue to the state '.38 As the Illinois administration changed in 1998, Belletire went from gambling regulator to the position of chief operating officer of special events at the National Jockey Oub, Sportsman's Park racetrack-illustrating the problem. of the 'revolving door' for government regulators being hired to become gambling industry advocates, and the need for enactment of the 1999 Gambling Commission's recommended I-year ban between being a regulator and working for the gambling indus- try.39 The 19908 also witnessed similar attempts by the gambling industry to obfuscate public understanding which was bemoaned by the national press: fI1he industry saw opportunity in the narrow and poorly funded area of compulsive gambling research. Through lucrative grants, it has developed its own body of data and undermined studies critical of the industry, triggering a wave of white papers.40 In an accurate summary of a frequent gambling industry tactic, Commissioner Richard Leone, of the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, summarized that if the gambling industry can 'keep the focus of the camera tight enough, .. , [it] can show gains [from gambling)',41 however, he indicated that the view would change as the camera zoomed out>42 and the socio-economic negatives would become apparent. Unlike most other studied public issue areas, gambling industry executives have targeted the academic community for harsh criticisms; for example, By comparison, tobacco companies were one of the largest sources of private funding for biomedical research 4s by the mid-l990s. The 1998 British Medical JOUT1IIlI revealed a global campaign by the tobacco industry to mold public opinion on passive smoking in Europe, the Far East, the Pacific-Rim (e.g., Australia), and Central and South America. 46 The Philip Morris Company reportedly 'setup a network of scientists throughout Europe who were paid to cast doubt on the risks of passive smoking and highlight other possible causes of respiratory problems '.47 Furthermore, it was reported that industry 'documents clearly show the industry inventing and orchestrating controversies by buying up scientists and creating influential outlets for tainted science '.48 One organization formed in 1953 and later known as the Council for Tobacco Research arguably had the purpose of 'sponsor[ing] a public relations campaign which [was] ... entirely 'procigarettes '.49 The National Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRO), which was formed and financed primarily by gambling interests as a nonprofit organization, has been similarly criticized by the national media. so It was also revealed that the tobacco industry apparently 'paid people to write articles favorable toward cigarettes and unfavorable toward public health research, and paid them even more when national magazines published their articles '. 51 Academia complained that this type of behavior was all too common among corporations involved in the production of a product that is harmful to society.52 The web of 'secrecy, deception, and propaganda' was supPosedly woven for the mere sake of profits. 53 The US national press has revealed similar tactics by the gambling industry. 54 
CLARIFICATION OF GOALS
The overall goal of all government authorities is well-recognized in common law and customary international law as the maintenance of a favorable legal order. Regarding public issue areas, government officials are charged with promoting the 'public health, safety, and welfare'. In the context of a product or mechanism that is potentially harmful to the public, government entities are ethically charged with at least determining the costjbenefits to society. As indicated during Congressional hearings in 1994 before the US House 58 Interestingly, Florida government officials and the public rejected legalized casino gambling in 1994 after Florida did its reports.
Another primary goal of the states and the US government should be to educate the public with regard to the negative consequences which can occur from legalized gambling activities; specifically, (1) new addicted gamblers, (2) new bankruptcies in the 35-mile feeder markets around concentrated gambling activities, such as casinos, and (3) new crime and corruption, particularly in the 3S-mile feeder markets.
Governmental entities should also cease from deceiving the public with regard to educational funding tied to legalize gambling activities. As any grade school library can attest by a quick reference to the 1994 World Book Encyclopedia Update, 59 state funding to education has not benefited from the revenues generated by legalized gambling activities. 60 In fact, the definitive study conducted by Money Magazine '1 in 1996 proved that in those states with legalized gambling activities, educational funding in real dollars was Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) 66 By the 1990s, the US legalized gambling industry netted more proftt than the combined totals of all US theme parks, cruise lines, the video game industry, the music industry, the movie industry, and professional and amateur sports. 67 In fact, the $600 billion that Americans legally wagered each year was, according to National Commissioner James Dobson of the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, more than the $450 billion Americans spent each year on groceries. 68 It was no surprise to the experts that the number of Gamblers Anonymous (GA) chapters doubled between 1990 and 1999. 69 Furthermore, a Harvard study underwritten by the gambling industry itself revealed that between 1994 and 1997 the increase in the number of US pathological gamblers was between 1.5 million and 2.2 million,70 which paralleled the spread of US legalized gambling-particularly, casino gambling.
'Opportunity theory proposes that, if opportunities are offered, people take advantage of them '.71 In the area of gambling, this principle is termed the accessibility principle; that is, as gambling opportunities are made more accessible to people, more people will gamble. Whether gambling per se constitutes an 'opportunity' in an economic sense is irrelevant; what is relevant is the ease of the public's accessibility to the gambling venue.
In any event, the 19908 recognized legalized gambling as one of the fastest growing pastimes in the US.72 Between 1982 , for example, Copyright © 2001 what Americans spent on legal gambling activities 'grew at almost twice the rate of income '.73 During the same time frame, the gambling industry experienced growth rates approximately 2.5 times that of the manufacturing industries. 74 The expansion of the US gambling industry occurred primarily during the 1980s and early 1990s. 75 'The legalization of slot machines in remote Montana locations (1985) , passage of federal legislation for tribal-run gambling (1988), the legalization of Iowa casino riverboats (1991) , and the introduction of electronic keno gambling in Oregon (1991) all encouraged the gambling industry in its expansion efforts '.76 By 1999, there were 37 states (Plus Washington, DC) with lotteries, and 28 states with casinos. 77 The growth of legalized gambling followed predictable sales pitches. 78 To gain entry into new jurisdictions, the gambling industry alleged that: (1) casinos and casino riverboats would appeal to tourists and provide 'family entertainment', (2) gambling would create new jobs, (3) gambling would generate a positive multiplier effect within the local economy,79 and (4) gambling revenues could be earmarked to support one of the 'Big Es' -education, the environment, the elderly, new employment and/or economic development. 80 However, the rapid expansion of legalized gambling did not occur without substantial socioeconomic costs. 81 The 'accessibility' of gambling can result in a portion of the public becoming new addicted gamblers with resultant social disorders, medical costs/conditions, and substantial private and public costs. B2 'Pathological gamblers tend to engage in forgery, theft, embezzlement, drug dealing, and property crimes to payoff gambling debts '.83 In the study conducted by the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center (NORC), a 'low-ball number' of each pathological gambler's costs to society totaled approximately $12000 in lost beneftts and the costs of policing during their lifetime. B4 With respect to gambling, Professor David Lester demonstrated that those states permitting 'gambling at casinos, sports betting, jai alai, and teletheaters had a greater per capita number of GA chapters '. 85 GA is an international organization which treats pathological (addicted) gamblers via a 12-step program similar to that used by Alcoholics Anonymous. 86 Owing to the ftnancial, marital, occupational, and legal problems endemic to pathological Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) gamblers and their families, pathological gamblers experience the following disorders at levels above the general population: depression, insomnia, migraines, intestinal disorders, anxiety attacks, high blood pressure, cardiac problems, and other stress-related medical conditions. 87 In addition to various medical conditions, pathological gamblers evidence social disorders such as anti-social personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorders. 88 Without attempting to quantify the unique value of every human life, it should be noted that between 12 and 18% of those in GA have attempted suicide, 45-49'110 have planned to commit suicide, 48-70% have contemplated suicide; and 80% have evidenced a death wish and stated that they 'wanted to die '.89 Similar to drug addiction, many pathological gamblers who have attempted to quit gambling have been largely unsuccessful. 90 'In a study of 232 attendees of GA meetings, Stewart and Brown (1988) found that total abstinence from gambling was maintained by only 8 percent one year after their first attendance, and by 7 percent at two years '.9l Productive fJis-a·flis Unproductive Avenues of Liability: 1be Strategic Historical Overview An analysis of case law can differentiate between what have been unproductive vis-a-vis productive avenues for bringing causes of action against the tobacco industry,92 and then lead to parallels between causes of action involving the tobacco industry and the gambling industry. In this context, causes of action brought by governments to recover the Medicaid and Medicare types of costs 93 associated with tobacco-related illnesses appeared to be the most successful. Second, causes of action brought on the basis of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)94 appeared to be headed for successful results in the 21st century. By modeling causes of action against the gambling industry on cases involving the tobacco industry, governments and private litigants had the potential to bring multi-billion-dollar cases against various segments of the gambling industry.
Only limited historical references will be mentioned herein involving some of the classic tobacco cases involving the traditional causes of action against the tobacco industry. This approach was utilized, because the classic cases since the 1950s were largely unsuccessful owing to the Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. theories under which they were brought. These cases tended to become mired in issues involving negligence and product liability as they interfaced with the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and/or a lack of 'cause-infact '. This analysis does not consider in-depth the parallel cases in issue areas other than gambling, such as cases involving gun manufacturers,9s because these issue areas are beyond the scope of this analysis. It should be noted, however, that from a government-policy perspective the mere threat of tobacco types of cases against industries, such as the firearms industry,96 have resulted in major policy changes within the industry itself.97
The Legal History of the Tobacco Cases
The first two waves of tobacco litigation occurred during the 1950s and the 1980s, respectively, but these litigations were unsuccessful because they were predicated in tort law 98 primarily under theories of negligence, deceit, and breach of express and implied warranties. The second wave also added the litigation theories of strict liability (e.g., product liability) and failure to warn. Success for plaintiffs, however, was found in the 1990s in initiatives that centered on a public health approach. 99 One of the frrst significant cases which involved trying to hold tobacco companies . liable for the injuries caused by smoking was Gree':' v~rican Tobacco Co. lOll decided during the late 1960s. The Green case capped a trend of over 100 unsuccessful cases initiated . during the 1950s against tobacco companies. 101 The Green case initially held that smokers were entitled to rely on the company's implied assurances that cigarettes were fit for the manufacturer's intended purpose of being smoked by consumers. 102 Furthermore, a consumer's death from smoking cigarettes rendered the tobacco company 'absolutely liable '. 103 However, in 1969 the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled en bane its own earlier decision, and held that cigarettes were not 'defective' per se. 104 The next classic case was Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc.,los which was ftled in 1983 on behalf of Rose Cipollone against three large cigarette manufacturers. The convoluted Cipollone case was twice lO6 before the US Supreme Court, and the Court basically held that causes of action against Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) 24 l. W. KINDT cigarette companies, which were based on a failure to warn consumers of the dangers of cigarette smoking, were preempted by the federal laws regulating warnings by tobacco product manufacturers. 107 However. the net impact of the US Supreme Court's second decision resulted in an ·apparent victory for the Cipollones,l08 because the Court ruled that the federal acts did not preempt numerous potential causes of action. 109 Even so, the Cipollones' attorneys voluntarily dismissed the case. 110 Apparently exhausting the Cipollones' attorneys with $5-6 million in legal costs,111 the tobacco companies 'had adopted the theory of General Patton that rather than spending their own assets, they would force the plaintiffs to spend all of their assets '. 112 By comparison, the Liggett Group reportedly spent more than $75 million.1l3 By the mid-199Os, the Cipollone family had dropped all of their legal efforts. U4 After their products to hook unsuspecting smokers '. 119 There are obvious parallels between these deceitaddiction arguments involving the tobacco industry and similar arguments against the gambling industry involving the addictive nature of VOMs which constitute 70-80% of casino revenues. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately decided that the Castano class action complaint should be dismissed. l20 The demise of the 'federal' class-action theory in this tobacco case opened the door for 'statewide' class-action suits in the individual states,and beginning in 1996, many such lawsuits were med. 121 The most notable of these class-action cases was a Florida class-action case RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al. v l26 If the penalty ever actually has to be paid, it would bankrupt the industry .127 The tobacco industry condemned the Engle decision and vowed to use every means at its disposal to undo the award. l28 Pro forma, the tobacco companies claimed the judgment should be overturned or mitigated because legal errors were made during the trial. l29 The tobacco industry also med a notice of removal of the case, which would actually transfer the entire case to federal court. 130 There are obvious parallels between statewide class-action cases against tobacco and potential cases against the gambling industry. For example, in December 1997, the New York Times summarized '[c]asino industry executives, who have proven ingenious at marketing their products as harmless adult entertainment, until recently had been loath to concede that some gamblers became addicted '. 131 While apologists for the gambling indUStry,132 such as William Eadington,133 have Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) 
;:~;"'jj b1 pr,",l;,~t:ff~ ~~blev"" ~ Pathological gamblers spend an inordinate amount of money on gambling compared to others who gamble (Lesieur, 1998) . For example, problem video lottery players in Nova Scotia account for 4% of those who play, yet contribute 53% of net revenue for video lottery playing (Focal Research, 1998) . The Australian Productivity Commission (1999) estimated that problem gamblers account for 5.7% of money spent on lottery play, 10.7% of casino table game play, 19% of scratch ticket sales, 33% of wagering on horses and dogs, and 42% of money spent on gaming machine play. Overall, problem gamblers expend 33% of all money spent on gambling in Australia. Focal Research (1998 Nova Scotia lottery players' survey. Prepared Significantly, as he was about to retire as editor of the Journal of Gambling Studies and a leader of the National Council on Problem Gambling (both allegedly heavily-influenced by the fmancial aura of the gambling indUStry),138 Professor Henry Lesieur pointedly calculated the portion of gambling revenues generated by pathological and problem gamblers by the type of gambling.139 For example, 26.7-55% of casino gambling revenues were calculated as coming from pathological and problem gamblers (Table 1) .140
The low-profile maintained by the gambling industry from the 19608 through the early 1990s allowed the industry to expand rapidly. However, the high-profile lobbying undertaken by the industry during the mid-l990s probably promoted the establishment of industry anathemas such as the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study C0mmis-sion and concomitant studies unflattering to the image projection desired by the gambling industry.
The US Theory Wbic:b Held the Tobacco CompaDies Liable: The Applicability to the
GamhUng IDdustry
The second theory which eventually cornered the tobacco industry was predicated upon the principle that as the states were incurring significant socio-medical costs to pay for the injuries caused by consumers utilizing tobacco products, the states should be able to sue the tobacco companies directly for those costs without being subrogated to the individual claims of persons injured by tobacco products. 141 States could bring suits against the tobacco companies on their own behalf without being subjected to classic defenses, such as contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and lack of cause_in_fact. 142 Mississippi's suit was quickly followed by lawsuits filed first by the attorney general of Florida and then by 40 other states. 145 The states' claims were enhanced because the tobacco companies were vulnerable to the classic claim that they were not 'internalizing the externalities' and that, therefore, the tobacco companies were being 'unjustly enriched' at the expense of the taxpayers. l46 In fact, the ideal plaintiff was predicated to be a 'public hospital', because such an institution· would have to pay (i.e., 'internalize') all of the costs of treating the diseases and illnesses caused by tobacco products (as well as alcohol products)147 without receiving any economic benefit whatsoever. l48 As medical centers initiate and/or develop their existing treatment centers for pathological and problem gambling, they should track these specific costs for future reimbursement.
By Sociologists generally refer to video-gambling machines as the crack-cocaine of creating new Manage. Deeis. Eeon. 22: 17-63 (2001) '.156 Perhaps before 1980, the industry could argue ignorance of the problems, but the industry as a whole did not establish or really acknowledge any problem gambling until 1995 or 1996, and even then many gambling companies did not post warnings, take any remedial actions, or fund research.
In 1995, Associate Professor Howard J.
Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Additions reported:
Gambling is an wJdictit;e behizvioT, mtJke 110 mislllke about it . .. Gambling bas all the properties of a psychoactM: subItance, and again, the n:aIIOn is that it changes the neurochemistry of the brain. 157 Furthermore, during a 1995 conference, 'Shaffer described gambling as an addiction no less potent than drugs or alcohol '. lSI However, it was not until 21 February 1996 with establishment of the NCRGI59 with nearly S2 million provided mainly by Boyd Gaming C0rpo-ration and other gambling interests that there was a general public acknowledgement by the gambling industry that 1t)his is an industry that recognizes that it has a problem and is willing to deal with it in constructive and positive ways'. U50 'The lobbying group for the gambling industry, the AGA, headed by Frank Fahrenkopf, annou.nced that part of the AGA's n:sponsibility was 'to develop a cIetIriIIghouse for addressing industry issues, including problem gambling ' .161 In this 'clearinghouse' context concerns were raised about potential conflicts of interest. Through Fahrenkoprs intervention, Shaffer was awarded the frrst grant by the industry-backed research center [NCRGJ-S139000 . .. 162 The content of this first study by Shaffer was criticized,163 and it also did not report the most important baseline numbers for the 120-152 studies analyzed,l64 which made it impossible for other academics to check and verify.16S Despite requests dating to 1998,166 and despite promising to provide these numbers during a 4 May 2000 conference sponsored by the NCRG at the University of Dlinois at Chicago Medical Center,I67
by the end of 2000, Associate Professor Shaffer had apparently not provided the requested baseline numbers-a fairly simple procedure. 168 As summarized by the Los Angeles Times in December 1998, 'Shaffer is now working on a new project for the industry's research arm [the NCRG]-of which he is a board member-for S465000, more than triple the amount of the first award ' .169 Supposedly concerned with some research issues at the NCRG during this time frame,l70 Professor Henry Lesieur and Dr.
Richard Rosenthal terminated their relationship with the NCRG research board.
With regard to the NCRG's research, one criticism is that it is pre-directed:
'They have an ageoda', says Valerie Lorenz, executive director of the Compulsive Gambling Center Inc. in BaItimote. If the industry can say s0me-thing is neuroIogK:alIy wrong with a problem gambler, 'then it's not the casinos' responsibility', she says. 1'1 In 1998, however, Shaffer did acknowledge the 'increasing trend'172 of more problem gamblers which among other reasons he attributed173 to 'easy access to casinos. lotteries and credit '. 174 Interestingly, the NCRG, which had been centered at the University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) since its 1996 inception, annou.nced in 2000 that it was moving to the Harvard Division OD Addictions proximate to Shaffer. 'I'bese types of associations raise questions of conflicts of interest and do not particularly benefit the research, the academics involved, or even the industry's goals.
Regardless of these debates, the individualized problems of gambling addiction are exemplified by one 1998 Chicago, Dlinois case where a mother addicted to gambling allegedly killed one and perhaps two of her children in separate instances to collect 5200000 of insurance money so she could continue to gamble. 17S This scenario resulted in a conviction and the subsequent imprisonment of the mother. State-sponsored gambling as government policy was further criticized in 1997 when it became public that the Colorado lottery was utilizing a 'Mindsort' model which allegedly was designed to appeal to pathological and problem gamblers, and which indicated that consistent gamblers were 'Lower on trial, but once hooked, hooked '.176 A 1997 in-depth survey by the Chicago Sun-Times reported that poor people were viewing the 'instant games' of the lottery as 'a source of income',177 and in a parallel survey it was reported that 51% of the people gambling were trying 'to win money,' instead of gambling for entertainment (34%).178
Recognizing that research has reported that 27-55% of casino revenues are coming from pathological gamblers and problem gamblers, 179 concerns have also been raised about appeals to this market segment. Louis . has seen such customer profiles because they were subpoenaed in c:rimina1 cases. In one, the customer bad been arrested at the casino for writing bad checks.
The patron's profile 'shows that casinos know certain individuals have gambling problems but do absolutely nothing to intervene, ... '.181 Apparently, gambling companies have sophisticated marketing knowledge of their customers which can be potentially misused to benefit the companies. Juries apparently adopted a libertarian philosophy in the tobacco cases and often accepted the legal defense of assumption of the risk; that is, the plaintiff consumers knew or should have known the risk of smoking, voluntarily began to smoke, and intentionally continued to use tobacco. 186 Such a libertarian philosophy apparently also infected the US public's imagination when dealing with the negative socio-economic consequences of gambling addiction. In other words, the public perception was that if people gambled too much it was their own responsibility.
For decades, the Nevada gambling establishment, in pa.rticular, ignored l87 or even denied lBB that there existed such a disorder as 'pathological gambling' or the associated 'problem gambling'. According to one expert '[i]n 1980 they weren't interested in deaHng with compulsive (i.e., pathological) gambling and were afraid to deal with it ' .189 Howard ShatTer further confused the issues when he proposed a new nomenclature in 1997 of 'levels' of 'disordered gambling'l90 instead of the generally accepted terms of 'pathological gambling' and 'problem gambling '. In 1987, however, Harrah's casino company 'began examining the issue ' .191 Critics claimed that the program initiated by Harrah's was largely 'window-dressing' for public relations purposes, 192 but it still constituted the first accepted effort by a casino company to recognize problems involving those who gambled too much, and by 1996 the AGA's Frank Fahrenkopf purported that 'the attitude of the industry has changed '.193 By comparison, other gambling companies continued to deny that there was much of a problem, if any Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) problem, until at least the mid-l990s, when a series of articles put the gambling industry on the defensive and highlighted the problems of pathological and problem gamblers. l94 Trying not to repeat the mistakes of the tobacco industry in denying for decades the problems . associated with their product, the lobbying group representing the gambling industry, the AGA, mobilized the gambling industry in the mid-l990s to admit finally some problems, including the problem that a certain percentage of gamblers would develop gambling problems and fall into the categories of 'pathological gamblers' and 'problem gamblers '.19s As the US Congress embarrassed the gambling industry with the enactment of the 1996 National
Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, the AGA scrambled to document the gambling industry's pre-existing concern for pathological gamblers and problem gamblers. However, the AGA could only produce scant industry examples basically from four US gambling companies and had to resort for examples to four Canadian/government-sponsored examples plus the Washington State Council of the State of Washington. l96 These examples were originally collated in an AGA 1996 loose-leaf binder entitled the 'Responsible Gaming Resource Guide', 197 which instead of emphasizing gambling problems among the adult clientele tended to emphasize casinoemployee problems and the prohibitions against underage gambling. 198 By comparison, one of the favorite defenses of the tobacco industry in a similar context was to deny any cause-in-fact (i.e., 'connection' or nexus) between the use of the product and the resultant claimed injury. Attorneys representing the tobacco industry would often flood juries with so many other potential causes for the plaintiffs' injuries that individual juries could not fmd a preponderance of the evidence indicating that the tobacco product had caused the injury. 199 Similarly, during the 1990s, the gambling industry began to position itself with alternate theories which obfuscated the classic symptoms associated with pathological gambling, as well as with problem gambling. The gambling industry also allegedly became involved in efforts to change the definitions, and even the terminology involved in delimiting what constituted a 'pathological gambler' and a 'problem gambler '. 200 Another factor which would assist the gambling industry in con-
fusing juries with other cause-in-fact issues involves the comorbidity of pathological gambling with the excessive use of alcohol and tobacco products. In other words, there appears to be some connection between the excessive use of alcohol and/or tobacco and pathological gambling, but the research efforts on these comorbidity issues are still in their infancy.
Despite these considerations, attorneys pursuing the gambling industry under theories involving pathological gambling issues and cause-in-fact will probably not be successful until there is a significant change in public perceptions.
POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS GeaeraI Policy AltematiYes for the US One generally recognized recommendation involves educating the public with the potential hazards of becoming addicted to various forms of gambling-both legal and illegal. While at first, it would appear that such a goal would be relatively easy to implement, the gambling industry has an obvious self-interest in downplaying any negative consequences associated with gambling activities, and the industry has the financial reserves to promulgate an extensive 'win-win' public relations campaign throughout the public domain.
One of the policies which the states could adopt would involve taking no action with regard to the socio-economic costs and medical costs caused by the gambling industry. This scenario seems unlikely since the success which the states have had in pursuing mega-lawsuits against the tobacco industry have encouraged them to file similar lawsuits against other industries, such as gun manufacturers. The gambling industry will be an obvious target on the list for states to me megalawsuits.
At the other end of the spectrum, the states could immediately initiate mega-lawsuits against the gambling industry which were similar to the mega-lawsuits against the tobacco and fll'CaI'IIlS industrieg201 during the 1990s. The gambling industry, however, could argue as a policy defense that the states did not have 'clean hands' because the states legalized gambling, particularly casinostyle gambling, during the 19808 and 19908 and should not thereafter be allowed to benefit financially via mega-lawsuits against an industry which the states have promoted. The states could counter this argument by claiming that they were deceived by the gambling industry with regard to the cost/benefits of introducing gambling into state economies and with regard to the socio-economic negatives accompanying gambling activities, particularly the costs associated with pathological and problem gamblers. Still, the defmitive analysis of the various 'studies' utilized to convince legislators of the benefits associated with legalizing various types of gambling, Legalized Gambling as a Strategy for Economic Development,202 was a 1994 report prepared by the Center for Economic Development at the University of Massachusetts. This report revealed that the studies produced and/or financed by the gambling industry were largely 'unbalanced'. In other words, state governments were misled, if not deceived, by the gambling industry. This report's conclusions regarding the obfuscation of the cost/benefit impacts of intrad~ ~ gambling activities inoo state economies reflected poorly upon the gambling industry, and these conclusions were also largely confmned by the NGISC Fmal Report 203 produced by the 1999 National Gambling Impact
Another alternative would be for the states 00 proceed slowly with their projected mega-lawsuits, while collecting additional data. In this scenario, the states should finance studies analyzing the socio-economic negatives associated with legalized gambling activities; specifically, addicted (pathological) gamblers, bankruptcies, and crime and corruption.
One strategic policy concern for government decisionmakers involves whether the goal is 00 reduce the public's utilization of the aDeged p0-tentially-hazardous product204 or whether the goal is simply to have the de facto imposition of increased costs on the industry-which are .then just passed along to consumers in the form of increased prices. 'lOS Perhaps the fundamental issue is whether governments should be promoting something which is not conducive to the public's health, safety, and welfare. In this context, there is a salient difference between the oobacco industry and the gambling industry-specifically, the tobacco industry has saturated the· US public market for centuries, whereas legalized gambling during the 20th century never approached market saturation 206 and constituted a relatively new phenomenon for the beginning of the 21st century. This latter scenario involving gambling means that governments may still maintain gambling's various forms as crimina1ized-with minimal social consequences or public backlash. By comparison, recriminaljzing tobacco 'would involve a public response reflective of centuries of market saturation (with no history of ever been criminalized in the US).
Mega-lawsuits by the state atoomey generals combined with private lawsuits involving class actions might easily prod state legislators into simply increasing taxes on the various forms of legalized gambling. For example, in Canada, all of the casino profits go to the government, and the government merely pays a management fee to the casino companies for managing the casino properties. The result is that all of the profits go to the government. By contrast, the tax rate for casinos in the US fluctuates at approximately 15% of casino revenues to the host state and another 5% 00 the local municipalities with all of the profits going 00 the casino companies. Furthermore, Native American casinos theoretically must pay nothing in taxes to their host states (although 'gaming compacts' with the individual states are supposedly negotiated to provide the states with some revenues).
With regard to both Native American casinos and regular non-Indian casinos, the states have been embarrassingly out-negotiated. The net result is that US casinos create minuscule tax revenues for the states compared 00 the socioeconomic costs created by the new pathological gamblers and problem gamblers who are created by the legalization of gambling activities. Even with the Canadian model of aD profits going to the government, the socio-economic costs of legalizing gambling activities overwhelm the benefits (i.e., new tax revcnues).21D7 Furthermore, the Canadian government must necessarily be amused with the ridiculously low tax rates which the US casinos enjoy-particularly since such low tax rates raise a 'red flag' signaling the appearance of corrupt decision-making. Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) proposed terminology of 'disordered gambling '. 217 Since the cost estimates ranging up to $52000 per pathological gambler were published and the methodology of determining them verifIed by the Journal, the gambling industry has been trying to lower these cost estimates via promoting new studies. Z21 Critics of the gambling industry found it ironic that apologists for the gambling industry had not questioned any of these higher cost estimates throughout the 19808 and early 1990s-although they claimed years of experience in analyzing these issues. 222 Since the mid-l990s, the gambling industry has scrambled to promulgate new cost estimates-which as might be expected, have been lower than the earlier estimates. Copyright C 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. One interesting scenario involves the NORC, which performed the cost estimates for the National Gambling Impact Study Commission. 223 The NORC estimated very few of the types of applicable costs and entirely omitted some types of costs. Consequently, these estimates were notoriously low and, therefore, lacked credibility. 224 The methodology utilized by NORC in calculating these estimates has been criticized as being flawed and incomplete-particularly regarding methodology.225 Other estimates which are at the lower end of the spectrum have been performed by reputable groups, such as the $10000 figure reported by the Wisconsin Policy Research Institute,226 but it is important to note that these are only partial listings of the total costs. 227 Public relations experts for the gambling industry tend to seize on these lower estimates without revealing to the public that they constitute only partial costs.
The spectre of intimidated academics has also been raised as in the case of the NORC estimates. When the academics from NORC were giving their preliminary report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, they were severely criticized by the gambling industry representatives sitting on the Commission. One commissioner representing the gambling industry even threatened the academics with legal action, claiming that their methodology and data collection methods were flawed.228 Skeptics noted that the NORC final report thereafter reported very conservative estimates involving both the costs of pathological gamblers and the prevalence of pathological gamblers in the general population. The NORC also changed the defInitional approach to calculating the prevalence of pathological gamblers but signif1C8Dtly, these changes were never incorporated into the academic literature by the general academic community. It is common practice when introducing new measures or statistics to calculate the old as well as the proposed new ones on the same data to provide a comparison or benchmark. NORC provided no such comparison/benchmark.
Strategic CoacerDs IDYohriDg Mega-Lawsuits
Some legal theorists have opined that governments have brought their actions against the tobacco and firearms industries without the bona fide intent of ever taking those cases to their ultimate conclusions in full-fledged trials. In other Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) words, instead of the tobacco industry utilizing its General Patton strategy of wearing down the opposition of individual plaintiffs,229 the states were paradoxically wearing down the tobacco industry by coordinating the actions of state attorney generals with a strategy which increased dramatically the downside risks of any litigation which went to its ultimate conclusion. However, given the history of the tobacco litigation throughout previous decades, it appeared unlikely that the tobacco industry would be impressed with this type of legal strategy if the industry did not indeed believe that the state attorney generals would take their causes of action to their ultimate conclusions in the court system.
By comparison, questions arise as to what should be the ultimate goals of the states in bringing mega-lawsuits against the gambling industry. One question involves whether it is necessary for the states to theorize the substantive content of any potential settlement with the gambling industry. This question would also involve whether or not settlements would need to be negotiated with the various market segments of the gambling industry such as lottery suppliers, off-track betting parlors, casinos, providers of electronic gambling devices, and other various groups. However, the payment of damages for government expenses occasioned by gambling addiction, including personal fmancial hardship, and parallel socio-economic costs do not necessarily have to have a close nexus to the relief requested by the states in their underlying complaints against the industry. Furthermore, it should be noted that actions based on the RICO statutes can ask for treble damages.230 As judicial approval of settlements is required in government cases involving federal class-action suits,231 government attorneys may wish to note that these lawsuits do not need to be brought as class actions per se. However, the net effect of these types of lawsuits often resembles classaction cases, particularly since large elements of the public are lepIesented by the attorneys seeking the redress. By comparison, RICO actions brought as civil suits 232 against the industry can be brought by private attorneys (who can receive reasonable attorneys' fees), but the subject class of plaintiffs must be approved by judicial decisionmaking.
Another issue involves the potential settlement monies. In any potential settlement involving the gambling industry, a fundamental concern for those states recovering damages would be how those damages should be utilized. By comparison, there was substantial criticism of the ways in which settlement monies from the tobacco industry were utilized by the various states.233 In Illinois, for example, most of the settlement monies ($350 million) that were initiated from the tobacco industry were given as property tax rebates to the Illinois taxpayers. 234 While this scenario may have ingratiated those officials then in office to the electorate, particularly since the property tax rebates were received by the electorate approximately 30 days before the election on 7 November 2000, strategic policymakers, including Illinois Attorney General James Ryan, voiced concerns about the long-term impacts of these types of policies. 235 The net effect appeared to be a 'backdoor' tax hike on the tobacco companies with the costs passed along to smokers and without any significant government commitment to reduce smoking. 236 A familiar criticism of the tobacco settlement is that as it was structured it would not make any substantive changes in the regulation of the tobacco industry.237 The settlement employed control and performance-based regulations which would impose specific requirements on tobacco companies and tell those companies what must be accomplished, but leave them to decide the mechanisms. 238 Alternatively, suggestions for incentivebased regulation would be arguably IOOre effective and force the ftrms to internalize the total costs of their activities.239 Perhaps this latter policy approach should also be utilized regarding the gambling industry and any potential settlement. ' .263 Considering that teenagers during the 19908 were already evidencing double the pathological and problem gambling rate of the adult population, the problem of addicted gamblers and the associated cost factors are projected to continue to increase in the future as more legalized gambling activities spread to new jurisdictions. Accordingly, the states would be well advised to calculate their socio-economic costs involving gambling using calculation methods comparable to the costs involving tobacco. According to the NGISC ExecutifJe Summary, 'it is conceivable that someday gambling enterprises may be franchised and, at least in parts of the country, become as common as fast food outlets are today '. 264 1bere-fore, with market saturation via legalized gambling a definite possibility whereby portions of the country could parallel the saturated effects of a market such as the Mississippi Gulf Coast, Nevada, or Atlantic City, states will need to project their costs into the future-which means billions of dollars paralleling the tobacco settlements. A24 . 44. Dyer (1998 44. Dyer ( , p. 1555 ) (hereinafter Dyer). 45. Cohen (1996, p. 488 (1994) and Florida Department of Commerce (1994). (1994, pp. 391. 398-4(0) . 60. Ibid. 61. Keating (1996, p. 142 
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New costs to u.S. taxpayers gamblers (1994-+ 1997) per ycar*. 166.6 (1999) $4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) ... 56690763 (1999) U.s. populatiOD (1994 U.s. populatiOD ( -+ 1997 Increue in problem ga.mblcrs2
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• 1.5 MiIHon New Pathological GambIers,I 1994 $4 000000 (1983) x 166.6 (1999) $6690763 (1999) 99. 6 (1983) CPI Current Year S FOI1IIer Year x CPI Former y~ =$ Current Year 166.6 (1999) $4000000 (1983»( 99.6 (1983) .. $6690763 (1999) Copyright C 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. (2()()1) Table A8*. Crime Costs**-Partial (Incarceration) Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers,l 1994 .. 56690763 (1999) 166.6 (1999) $4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) '"" 56690763 (1999) Copyright C 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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. Dew. £Con. 22: 17-63 (2001) FootDDtes for TUie A3 l. W. KlNDT Panel of the 'Impact of Legalized Gambling on Historic Communities', 50th Nat'l Preservation Conf., Nat'} Trust for Historic Preservation, Chicago, TIl., Oct. 18, 1996. Tom Grey was incredulous that Eadington and the University of Nevada had been studying gambling over 20 years and yet Eadington 'could not even estimate the cost of a pathological gambler '. ld. (exchange between William Eadington, Dir., Inst. for the Study of Gambling and Commercial Gaming, Univ.
Nev.-Reno, and Tom Grey, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Coalition Against Legalized Gambling).
In 1999 even after the conclusion of the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Eadington was still declining to report any numbers involving social costs or to give any estimates. 
